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His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck acceded to the Golden 
Throne at the age of 17 in 1972 after the sudden death of his 
father His Majesty Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, the Third King of 
Bhutan. When he was formally crowned on June 2, 1974, he 
became the youngest monarch in the world. O December 14, 
2006, at the age of 51, he announced his immediate abdication 
and the transfer of the throne to his eldest son Jigme Khesar 
Namgyal Wangchuck, two years before initially planned. It was 
the first time in world history that a monarch, who was initially 
vested with absolute powers, voluntarily reduced the scope of 
these powers and eventually abdicated with no other reason than 
his own dedication to political reforms. His reign was unique 
considering not only the conditions of his accession to the throne 
and departure, but also the contents of the policies he conducted 
during more than thirty years of his reign.  
Bhutan is one of the least developed countries in the world. Yet it 
has become not only a living conservatory of the Buddhist 
culture, but also a laboratory for political reform in a traditional 
society. This is unique in the world and most significant in the 
Himalayan region where local polities, when confronted to major 
How to Reform a Traditional Buddhist Monarchy 
 2 
challenges as experienced in Sikkim in the 1970s and as currently 
seen in Nepal in a totally different context, have never succeeded 
in modernising themselves without disruptive consequences both 
for the society and the political structures. 
Contrary to Huntington’s general predicaments that “the struggle 
between a pro-status quo traditional elite and a pro-change 
modernising elite is likely to be fatal to any monarchical system 
lacking the western European political-cultural background” 
(Huntington, 1968, also see Rose, 1977), the process of political 
modernization has not been fatal to the monarchical system in 
Bhutan. On the contrary, the monarch has been the main agent of 
modernization as demonstrated during the reign of the Fourth 
King. His abdication has even enhanced the legitimacy of his 
dynasty whose founder had been elected more than a century 
ago.1 Indeed, reform in Bhutan has not followed usual patterns 
generally observed in other parts of the world. The Fourth King’s 
main historical legacy might not be only the changes he allowed 
in his country, but also his willingness to promote genuine 
Bhutanese ways and means towards modernization. The 
democratisation process has been carefully thought and prepared 
throughout his reign. 
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Although Bhutan can still be seen as a conservative polity 
according to western standards, the present paper intends to 
demonstrate that the reign of Fourth King of Bhutan was a 
decisive though progressive march towards reform both from 
social, political, and diplomatic points of view.  
Bhutan Political Society: Entering the 21st Century 
One of the basic problems in Bhutan, as far as political reform is 
concerned, is that the people have neither been ready so far to 
spontaneously welcome changes that have been introduced by the 
monarchy nor have they been organised to provoke these changes 
themselves. Bhutanese society is essentially conservative. In that 
context the first achievements of the Fourth King have been to 
inject the germs of reform into the minds of people. 
When he ascended to the throne, Bhutan was still an isolated 
country with a conservative and traditionalist polity. Indeed the 
Third King had initiated most significant and substantial reforms 
between 1952 and 1972 in the political, diplomatic, social and 
economic spheres. None of the changes occurring during the last 
thirty years would have been possible without going through this 
period. Yet those reforms had little impact on the way the general 
populace was able to picture itself as an actor of modernization. 
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Its political consciousness has always been very low. The 
politicisation process that had significant impact on large sections 
of the population in other South Asian countries had not 
mobilised Bhutanese crowds, except for Nepali Bhutanese in the 
southern districts.  
Various factors can explain this situation. Bhutan’s ability to 
insulate itself over many decades from the influence of social and 
political forces that dominated South Asia had been decisive. 
Also a determinant had been the low level of education of the 
average population whose priorities had stood out of the political 
sphere. The existence of a ruling elite, largely unchallenged by 
adverse forces, and willingness to keep the initiative leadership as 
far as modernisation is concerned, had prevented the emergence 
of organised factional politics. Eventually, consensus politics, 
which has been one of the major characteristics of Bhutanese 
traditional society, had provided little scope for popular 
participation in the decision-making process, apart from 
organised decentralisation.  
None of the reforms bestowed by the Fourth King would be 
significant without mentioning their social and political context. 
This leads us to consider two major factors of any 
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democratisation process: ideology and social mobilization. 
Although important challenges remain ahead regarding these two 
essential issues, the contribution of the Fourth King has been 
decisive to help Bhutan enter into a new political era. 
Gross National Happiness: Inventing a Cohesive National 
Ideology 
Theocratic tradition prevailing before the institution of the 
monarchy in 1907 provided little ideological support to the new 
regime other than religious principles. The ruling elite has never 
complied with any dogmatic approach and political rhetoric has 
been little stultifying. After Bhutan opened to the outside world 
beginning in the 1960s, the official rhetoric tended to be 
modernist in content, due to the influence of foreign patterns, 
essentially coming from India, and to the requirements of 
development. Bhutan has never classified itself in terms of 
socialist or liberal policies, although egalitarianism occasionally 
manifests in public statements. The country lacked a mobilizing 
concept that could symbolise both the people’s aspiration and the 
government’s endeavours. 
The Fourth King has filled this gap by coining the term Gross 
National Happiness (GNH). He has made an explicit commitment 
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to preserve Bhutan’s cultural heritage and natural environment 
while formulating national goals and policies not only on the 
basis of socio-economic progress and Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), but also by taking into account less quantifiable factors 
like spiritual well-being of the people. He has also engaged the 
country in a politicisation process. Philosophical by content, 
GNH has become an ideological vector. It has been participating, 
to some extent, to the progressive political maturation of the 
people who have been given the opportunity to view modern 
advancement in the context of genuine sustainable human 
development rather than just income growth.  
This approach has been inspired by traditional principles like 
conciliation, pragmatism and compassion. The welfare of the 
public is a modern version of Buddhist doctrine (fundamental 
need for harmony in human relations). Although the concept was 
first introduced in the 1980s, the term has been “a popularisation 
of the distinct Bhutanese perception of the fundamental purpose 
of development which can be traced throughout the period of 
development.” (Priesner, 1999). The tendency to describe this 
concept with reference to the Buddhist cosmology (Thinley, 
1999) is clear evidence of its ideological content. Among the 
main features of that ideology, the importance of environment 
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preservation is also inherited from Buddhist values. The role of 
welfare state, through a paternalist approach of political 
organisation is a prolongation of the feudal organisation that 
prevailed in traditional self-sufficient local communities. This 
concept has proved so far to be a rather cohesive national 
ideology, which has been a factor for legitimising the monarchy. 
It has provided a coherent political basis to the regime, which is 
rather new to Bhutan. It has also laid the basis of what could be 
future Bhutanese politics including a more active pros and cons 
system. As demonstrated throughout various seminars and papers, 
(Ura, et al, 1999). GNH has created a comprehensive framework 
to structure potentially substantive political and social debates 
around four essential platforms: economic development, 
environmental preservation, cultural promotion and good 
governance.  
Although there is a certain degree of incompatibility between the 
western derived rhetoric relating to politicisation and Bhutanese 
practice, since the former may be irrelevant to the latter, it can be 
argued that the development of a nationalist ideology in Bhutan 
has been the first step of a broader process which has started to 
influence all sectors of the society, including those, like 
Bhutanese of Nepalese origin, who have expressed doubts about 
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certain aspects of the cultural promotion. The essence of an 
ideology is to promote a structured and coherent social and 
political model that can be exposed to criticism within or without 
the model. So far, GHN has had this function.  
Social Mobilization: National Integration Versus Public 
Mobilization 
The Fourth King had shown clear evidence of his willingness to 
make such a debate possible in the long-term. Yet he had to take 
into account the level of political consciousness of his people and 
potential internal sources of conflict. This is why his moves have 
been cautious and progressive. While judging his democratic 
records, one should never forget that his objective had been to 
prevent the disruption of Bhutan’s unique cultural and social 
heritage based on consensus. As shown in neighbouring Nepal, 
modernization can have dramatic consequences on a traditional 
polity if the monarchy, which is the symbol of this polity, is not 
able to incarnate consensus-building and progressive reform. 
National integration is part of this process, particularly in the 
Himalayan region where many ethnic tensions have been 
observed during the past thirty years. One of the main challenges 
the Fourth King had to face during his reign was the nation-
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building process which experienced major threats both on internal 
and external fronts with the intensification of communal tensions 
that questioned national unity and cultural identity. Although the 
Northern Bhutanese culture associated with the Drukpa tradition 
is dominant, the kingdom is multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and 
multi-lingual. The national integration was generally considered a 
success in Bhutan where all the minorities could enjoy their own 
culture within the mainstream of the Bhutanese society. During 
the 1980s, some sections of the Lhotshampa (Nepali) minority 
started to view the national integration process as being 
detrimental to their identity, and homogenisation resulting from 
modernisation as leading to the exclusive domination of the 
Drukpa culture. The declaration of Dzongkha as the only national 
language, the termination of Nepali in schools, the promulgation 
of a code of etiquette (Driglam Namzha) and the identification of 
illegal immigrants through census operations were assimilated to 
a “Bhutanisation” process whose only purpose was to favour the 
culturally and politically dominant group. This perception has 
been amplified by differences existing between Lhotshampa and 
other ethnic communities in terms of political consciousness. 
Contrary to the Drukpa society, people of the Nepali origin have 
been exposed to politics at least from the beginning of the 1950s, 
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when the roots of ethnic dissent in Bhutan can be traced. Political 
developments in Sikkim during the early 1970s, the entrenchment 
of Gorkha militancy in the Darjeeling Hills during the early 
1980s and political upheavals in Nepal from 1989 contributed to 
a greater politicisation of the people of the Nepali origin and to 
the exacerbation of the crisis that led to the departure of 
thousands of people from the southern district of Bhutan to 
refugees camps in Eastern Nepal.  
Although the problem in Southern Bhutan has been largely 
mitigated, the presence of large minority groups, which were 
allegedly disenfranchised under the hereditary monarchy (Dhakal 
& Strawn, 1994, pp.133-34) was problematic for the regime. The 
Lhotshampa issue can be interpreted to some extent as the first 
significant challenge to the GNH ideology as people of the Nepali 
origin seriously questioned some aspects of the policy of cultural 
promotion like Driglam Namzha which they consider as a revival 
of traditional Bhutanese culture. Some factors like the ideological 
influence from India, especially the radical one like Naxalism, 
and from Nepal with the potential impact of the Maoist 
Movement, have probably contributed to the growing dissent in 
southern districts. Some groups have been attracted towards the 
radical ideas prevailing in the adjoining Indian provinces of 
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Assam and West Bengal. During the 1980s the growing success 
of ideas like overthrowing the monarchy in Nepal had been an 
inspiration for some dissidents of the Nepali origin in Bhutan to 
remove the monarchical system of Bhutan too. The potential 
nexus between ULFA Bodo outfits and Bhutanese refugees that 
eventually led to military action against Indian insurgents lodged 
in Bhutanese territory, might also have compelled Bhutan to 
mellow its rigid attitude on the issue. The question was not only 
the potential survival of the regime but also the identity of Bhutan 
itself. This is the reason why anti-Drukpa activities in southern 
Bhutan compelled the Royal Government from the beginning to 
bring them into the mainstream and integrate them into Bhutanese 
culture. This was probably the price to pay at that time to national 
unity. This issue had a considerable impact on the Bhutanese 
society. It contributed to some extent in increasing the political 
consciousness of the people, not only within the Lhotshampa 
community, but also among the rest of the population that was 
concerned with growing turmoil in the southern district as shown 
by the intensive debates that took place at that time in the 
National Assembly and in local committees.  
This has been part of the overall process of social awareness in 
Bhutan that leads to a consideration of the people themselves as a 
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political entity and to trace the evolutions they have gone through 
during the past thirty years. The exposition to education and to a 
lesser extent (because more recent) to the media has been crucial. 
Under the Fourth King’s reign, the Bhutanese society has 
undergone dramatic structural changes evinced by impressive 
achievements in education which have permitted major 
evolutions, particularly among young Bhutanese who are 
absorbed into both the national system and the international 
mainstream. Education coverage in the kingdom has been 
expanding rapidly at all levels and is provided free of cost. 
Progress has been remarkable with the gross enrolment rate 
exceeding 70%. The national literacy rate is now over 60%. 
While the Government’s efforts in the past have largely been 
directed at attaining universal primary education and ensuring 
basic education for all, more recent efforts have focused on 
expanding the quality and capacity of secondary and tertiary 
levels and on strengthening technical education and vocational 
training. Education is a clear prerequisite to creating political 
awareness. It is also essential for the development of meritocracy 
that has been the core of the government system created by the 
Fourth King.2 
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Among other legacies, the Fourth King has also allowed a 
progressive development of the media. Kuensel the National bi-
weekly newspaper which started as a government news bulletin in 
1965 was formally delinked from the government and granted 
autonomy in 1992.3 TV and Internet were introduced in Bhutan in 
1999 at the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the King’s 
enthronement. Less than ten years later the Internet and mobile 
phones have a great impact on the way of life in the capital city.4 
Eventually the development of tourism, which has become the 
second revenue contributor sector of Bhutan after hydropower, 
also has had an impact on the overall society. A record number 
(13626) of tourists visited Bhutan in the 2005-2006 fiscal year 
compared to only 274 in 1974 (Bhutan Times, 2006). The Fourth 
King has also made a strong commitment to private sector 
development starting from the sixth five year plan (1987-1992). 
The sector remains weak and is nowhere near its expected 
position of providing employment to the increasing number of 
educated Bhutanese youth, but it has contributed to more social 
awareness. More generally speaking private initiative has been 
encouraged in all sectors of the society and traditional social 
constraints have been alleviated to some extent as shown in 1996 
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when the King commanded the abolition of the goongda woola 
(free labour for development works) system. 
All these evolutions have had an impact on the way the society 
pictures itself. Because solidarity has always been strong in local 
communities, social categorisation as applied in the West, was 
not relevant to describe the traditional rural Bhutanese society 
prior to the 1970s. This situation has been changing with 
modernisation. The fault lines found in all developing countries –
between rural and urban societies, haves and haves not, the 
younger and older generations, men and women- have been 
progressively developing in Bhutan too. Population growth, 
urbanization and tertiarization of the economy have brought 
many changes. Individual behaviours have already been affected. 
New trends have emerged with either good or negative impact on 
the overall society. After completing their education abroad, 
young Bhutanese have seeded a lifestyle steeped in consumerism 
and Western values. While the ancient elite had been socialised 
under traditional cultural principles, a growing number of young 
Bhutanese are being influenced by foreign trends coming from 
India or from the West. This is a challenge to the national 
ideology that needs to be addressed on the political level but is 
also a factor of progress. The influence of religion has been 
                                                                          Thierry Mathou 
 15 
eroded, especially among younger generations. Intra-family 
solidarity has been declining between urban and rural 
communities. In some cases traditional values have adapted quite 
well to foreign trends, in some other cases they have suffered 
from modernisation. In a town like Thimphu where there is a 
congregation of all kinds of people, it is more and more difficult 
to ensure that Driglam Namzha is observed properly. As far as 
collective behaviour is concerned, the most significant evolution 
has been the emergence of a middle-class, whose growth has 
started to impact the traditional society and polity. New social 
needs have emerged. Although most of them have not yet been 
translated into political requirements, the time has come where 
further political reforms are needed.  
Political consciousness remains low in Bhutan compared to 
neighbouring countries as shown in December 2005 when the 
King first announced his intention to abdicate. Most of the people 
–including the bureaucratic elite- were in disarray. The Election 
Commission established on 31st December 2005 has engaged in 
intensive efforts to teach the population how to vote.5 Yet 
progress has been made under the guidance of the Fourth King. 
As observed in other developing countries, the development of 
concepts like consumer rights, which have been progressively 
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gaining grounds in Bhutan, are bound to lead to further changes 
through lobbying and political mobilisation. Till the introduction 
of the constitution, the government has not formally banned 
political parties but it was well understood by the Bhutanese elite 
that the formation of such organisations had been discouraged. 
After the King’s decision, the day has come when political parties 
are not only permitted but are also expected to become essential 
ingredients in a more and more liberalised and participatory 
political context.  
Political Institutions of Bhutan: The March Towards 
Democracy 
The Fourth King has been vested with absolute powers during 
most of his reign. He has not been under any pressure, neither 
internal nor external, to embark on the path of political 
modernisation. When he inherited the throne, Bhutan was living 
in peace and tranquillity and could have remained for several 
decades, with the support of India, the sleeping beauty of the 
Himalayas. Political changes under absolute rule are usually the 
result of long and painful social and political strife conducted in 
the context of economic underdevelopment or oppression. Nepal 
has given the most recent example of such a phenomenon. This 
was not the case in Bhutan. Indeed some reforms have been 
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called for, especially in the context of political strife in the 
Himalayas including in southern districts of Bhutan. That Jigme 
Singye Wangchuck succeeded a monarch who was himself a 
genuine reformer must also be taken in account. Yet the Fourth 
King has been keen to follow his own path to reach an objective 
that has been the vital lead of his reign: leading Bhutan towards 
modernization, decentralisation and eventually participation and 
democratisation, and converting a hereditary absolute system of 
government into a constitutional monarchy. All the reforms he 
has decided during his reign have been put in perspective by his 
abdication and by the introduction of a draft constitution. His last 
decisions as a ruling monarch have demonstrated a clear sense of 
continuity and anticipation from his part, as if everything had 
been prepared from the beginning of his reign, which seems to be 
the case to some extent. Moreover and contrary to the practice of 
most monarchical systems in the world, modesty has been the 
hallmark of this King whose style of living and ruling has been as 
close to the people as it can be in such a regime. His institutional 
reforms have been organised under three major headings: 
decentralization, devolution of his own powers, and good 
governance, paving the way for the constitution. 
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Decentralization 
Organised decentralization has been rather new in Bhutan. The 
objective of the first two kings was to enhance centralization to 
strengthen the monarchy. Reorganisation of local powers both at 
the district and village levels was part of the Third King’s 
modernization programme. Yet it is the Fourth King who really 
initiated the process of administration decentralization to involve 
the people at the grass roots level more intensively in the 
planning and implementation of the development activities. 
Between 1976 and 1981 District Development Committees 
(Dzongkhag Yargye Tshogchung or DYT) were established as a 
first step. Today there are 20 DYTs with more than 560 elected 
members. In 1991 Gewog Development Committees (Gewog 
Yargye Tshogchung or GYTs) have been set up at the 
block/gewog-level. Today the DYTs and GYTs play a central 
role in formulating the Five-year Development Plans. The Fourth 
King has been keen in strengthening all traditional local forums 
by developing people’s participation in the socio-economic 
decision process. Although highly dominated by local elites, 
DYT and GYT proved to be useful platforms for informal 
consultation. The creation of these committees has been a 
significant institutional innovation (Ura, 1994). These elected 
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bodies that have scattered all around the country have been used 
by their members as forums to articulate local needs and 
grievances. They have been fully participating in the legislative 
process (Mathou, 2000). Further effective measures were 
undertaken to deepen the decentralization process with special 
emphasis on devolving local development planning, 
implementation and monitoring. To improve the quality and 
experience of the GYT leadership, a nation-wide re-election of 
gups (leaders of respective GYTs) was held, on the basis of 
universal suffrage, from September to December 2002. Another 
significant change was the replacement of the leadership of DYT, 
from a civil servant to an elected representative, allowing a better 
response to the development needs of respective districts. It is no 
surprise that the Constitution mentions the establishment of local 
governments in all twenty dzongkhags with view to “provide 
democratic and accountable Government for local communities” 
(Constitution Drafting Committee, 2007).  
Devolution of powers 
The Fourth King also proved to be in favour of a progressive 
devolution of his powers. In 1991, he relinquished the 
chairmanship of the Planning Commission, which is an essential 
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body in the Bhutanese administrative system. In 1998, he 
devolved full executive powers to an elected cabinet, the 
authority of which was defined by the National Assembly during 
its 1999 session, and he re-introduced the principle of his own 
responsibility. As he once stated “the time has come to promote 
greater people’s participation in the decision making process. Our 
country must be ensured to always have a system of government 
which enjoys the mandate of the people, provides clean and 
efficient governance, and also has an inbuilt mechanism of 
checks and balances to safeguard our national interest and 
security” (Kuensel, 1998). 
From that very moment, Bhutan ministers (lyonpos) were no 
more appointed by the King. They had to be voted in by the 
National Assembly. The idea of a cabinet with elected ministers 
came as a surprise to most Bhutanese who were not familiar with 
such a concept. Giving the National Assembly (Tshogdu) the 
power to elect ministers, even on a pre-selected short list basis, 
has contributed to introduce a larger sense of political 
responsibility among its members. The Tshogdu, which has 
progressively emerged as a key player in the Bhutanese political 
system, had been largely conservative. Being directly involved in 
the designation process of the Cabinet members did not change 
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its global attitude towards fundamental political issues. However, 
it forced it to adopt a new perspective. The consequence of this 
reform was also important for ministers and for the bureaucracy. 
Although many members of the administration and the assembly 
pleaded for the King to keep the chairmanship of the Cabinet, the 
King insisted on renouncing his function of head of Government. 
Henceforth, it was decided that the chairmanship would be 
assumed by elected ministers on a one-year term rotational basis. 
The conditions of a genuine premiership system was created but 
with a very short term. Cabinet members, even had to unwillingly 
learn to emancipate from the King’s guidance. Indeed the 
monarch has continued to inspire national politics. Yet the 
formation of an elected cabinet was not a strategy to deflect the 
criticism of democratic militants and dissidents in exile. It was a 
new step towards further democratisation as shown by the latest 
reforms. It was then as necessary to persuade bureaucratic elites 
that they could emancipate from the King as it is important today 
to educate the people to participate in open elections. 
Good Governance 
Good governance has been high on the agenda of the Fourth King 
who commended the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) on 
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many occasions to rationalise and strengthen the bureaucracy. 
Promoting efficiency, transparency, accountability and 
professionalism is part of his legacy. New administrative bodies 
like the Employment agency have been created. The introduction 
of a clearer hierarchy, the establishment of a career line for civil 
servants and the pervasion of corruption have also been 
promoted. The Position Classification System introduced in 
December 2005 is a good example of what has been done to 
enhance good governance in the Civil service which has acquired 
a high standard of performance and is one of the most effective in 
the sub-region. Enhancing private sector development has also 
been part of good governance efforts. The Fourth King has also 
contributed to enhancement of the judiciary system. The creation 
of an independent Office of Legal Affairs was proposed in 1999 
to facilitate the evolution of the justice system to meet challenges 
ahead. This evolution is one of the most interesting in Bhutan as 
it combines traditional factors and modernization forces. As noted 
by the Chief Justice, Bhutan has to “draw inspiration from the 
wisdom of the past. At the same time it must face the challenges 
of changing times” (Gupta, 1999, p.75). For example, the concept 
of jabmi which is a traditional system of legal representation has 
been enhanced to guarantee the rights of defence. Generally 
                                                                          Thierry Mathou 
 23 
speaking the development of Bhutanese institutions has been 
accompanied and supported by further development of the 
national law and judicial system. 
All these reforms have contributed to open the scope of political 
debate. Processes of negotiation which are consistent with the 
Bhutanese tradition of consensus have been invented to allow 
some form of contestation to be channelled through dialogue 
procedures. Local development committees have been 
contributing to this effort, as did the National Assembly. 
Although the main function of the GYTs and DYTs has remained 
the development process, these committees have had a 
momentum of their own which has enhanced the political 
awareness and participation of the people. Discussions in these 
bodies have been often vigorous as shown by the sessions of the 
Tshogdu when some of the choices made by the Fourth King 
were even criticised. The contest in national elections – both in 
the Royal Advisory Council and in the National Assembly- have 
also been more and more vigorous and controversial. The ancient 
Tshogdu was far from a western parliament and could easily be 
compared to a rubber stamp institution at the beginning of the 
1970s. However, its powers have been regularly increased under 
the Fourth King. This body has gained authority in the legislative 
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sphere that progressively superseded its function as a consultative 
body. The decision in 1998 to reintroduce the vote of confidence 
in the King, although symbolical, enhanced his authority as a 
representative of the people. On various occasions members of 
the National Assembly (chimis) have expressed views that 
differed significantly from those defended by the King and the 
RGOB. Debates have been more and more open to criticism and 
propositions. Discussions on the annual budget have also become 
more and more incisive. The introduction of party politics came 
as the next logical step in this process.  
The Constitution 
Until recently, Bhutan was still ruled under a royal decree of 
1953 giving the monarchy absolute powers. Only the adaptation 
of a written constitution could fully replace this decree, 
encompass the reforms introduced since 1974 and promote a new 
form of government, namely a constitutional monarchy based on 
a two-party parliamentary system. The draft constitution was the 
last and most significant legacy of the Fourth King to political 
reform in Bhutan. He commanded the drafting in September 
2001. A Constitution Drafting Committee, comprising of 39 
members whose Chairman was the Chief Justice, was then 
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formed. The initial project has evolved through intense 
deliberations on the principles of state policies, rights and duties 
of citizens, religious pluralism and the state monastic community, 
separation of powers of the main organs of the state, the concept 
of democratic government based on a party system, political 
neutrality of the civil service, autonomy of the constitutional 
offices, local governance and decentralisation, the structure of 
government, and power and authority of the state apparatus. The 
first draft was released in March 2003. It was extensively 
distributed and discussed throughout the country often in 
presence of the King himself who visited all 20 districts to hold 
consultations with the public before its presentation to the 
National Assembly and before the King handled his power to the 
Crown Prince in December 2006.  
The 35-article constitution has been written to be the base of a 
completely new system. Although the institution of monarchy 
remains central, many changes have been introduced. Some are 
quite unusual. For instance the monarch –who can be a woman, 
which is new in Bhutan - shall step down and hand over the 
throne to his successor upon reaching the age of 65 years. The 
concept of an automatic monarchical retirement is a unique 
constitutional concept. Provision is also included for the monarch 
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to abdicate for wilful violations of the Constitution. Fundamental 
rights are proclaimed. Indeed the pursuit of Gross National 
Happiness is considered under principles of state policy. The goal 
is to produce a stable and long-lasting democracy. The 
constitution significantly increases individual rights, including the 
freedom of expression, assembly and association. The new 
parliament is bi-cameral with elected National Council and 
National Assembly. Most significantly, political parties are 
legalised for the first time in Bhutanese history. They may run for 
the lower house (National Assembly) but not for the upper house 
(National Council). Representation in the National Assembly is 
introduced on the base of a two-party democratic system. The 
principle of national referendum is introduced. Five 
Constitutional Bodies are proclaimed: the Royal Audit Authority, 
the Royal Civil Service Commission, the Pay Commission, the 
Election Commission and the Anti-corruption Commission.  
Although the content of the constitution has to be evaluated when 
all the bodies and procedures are fully in place, and after a period 
of adjustment, it is clear that a new age has started in Bhutanese 
politics. 
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Bhutan and the World: The Age of Diplomatic Maturity 
A new age has also started on the diplomatic front under the 
guidance of the Fourth King. Bhutan’s vulnerable geopolitical 
location between larger, richer, stronger and occasionally 
antagonistic neighbours has made external relations crucial for its 
survival as an independent state. For that reason, and from a 
historical perspective, its diplomacy has been mainly focused on 
neutralizing its external environment to allow internal stability. 
Basic principals of this policy had been coined in the 1960s under 
the leadership of the Third King. A close relationship with India 
on the regional scene and a pragmatic approach of all other 
bilateral relations have been guiding Bhutan’s foreign policy for 
more than four decades.  
While following the same path as his father, King Jigme Singye 
Wangchuck had to lead the country in the context of a rapidly 
changing environment that implied some adjustments and 
allowed the creation of a new face of Bhutanese diplomacy. One 
of his main challenges has been to keep Bhutan out of shifting 
regional and world politics. Among the three Himalayan 
kingdoms that pre-existed his accession to the throne, Bhutan 
succeeded best in conciliating four mutually exclusive objectives: 
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sovereignty, preservation of its cultural heritage, a “special 
relationship” with India, and broadening of its foreign relations. 
As the Fourth King once stated, Bhutan is first “politically 
committed to a strong and loyal sense of nationhood to ensuring 
the peace and security of its citizens and the sovereign territorial 
integrity of its land.” Second, it aims “to achieve economic self-
reliance.” Third, it wishes “to preserve the ancient religions and 
cultural heritage that have for so many centuries strengthened and 
enriched Bhutan’s life” (Mathou, 1994). 
Although it remained discreet on the diplomatic scene, Bhutan 
has become a fully responsible member of the international 
community during his reign. This was possible through the 
gradual institutionalisation of the political system that has started 
in the late 1960s, and was considerably enhanced during the 
1970s. The formation of a Foreign Affairs Department in 1970 
was followed in 1972 by the creation of a fully-fledged Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs that was headed for 26 years (1972-1998) by 
the same minister.6 Stability and continuity were the keys not 
only to create a professional Civil Service that has generated 
several high quality diplomats including ambassadors and the 
current Secretary General of SAARC, but also to allow Bhutan to 
implement a foreign policy, which has gained in maturity. 
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Establishing with India a more balanced relationship than in the 
past was essential as far as national sovereignty is concerned. 
Though the 1949 Treaty with India has often been misinterpreted 
to mean that India controlled Bhutan's foreign relations, the 
Kingdom has been keen to handle all of its foreign affairs itself 
including the sensitive (to India) border demarcation issue with 
China. Both countries have had a common interest in developing 
a real partnership. The détente that prevailed from the mi-1970s 
between India and China brought relief and confidence in New 
Delhi which started to consider Bhutan more valuable as a partner 
than as a protectorate. The Fourth King paid regular visits to 
India and promoted a win-win relationship with his neighbour. 
While praising Indian’s constant and regular efforts for the 
economic development of Bhutan, he proved to be a trusted ally 
of New Delhi, both on the regional scene and at the United 
Nations. He could count in return on India’s positive attitude on 
the difficult issue of Nepali dissidents.  
At a certain point, the interaction between this issue and 
Assamese separatist activity in southern Bhutan became critical 
both in terms of national security and sovereignty for Bhutan, but 
also regarding bilateral relations with India. Ordering in late 2003 
Bhutan’s first military campaign in well over a century, to oust 
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those separatists who were using Bhutanese territory to launch 
raids against targets in India, was certainly one of the most 
historical decisions taken by the Fourth King. This was a last 
resort decision. His insistence to invite militants for talks to 
resolve the crisis through dialogue, although it was not New 
Delhi’s approach, was a revealing sign of diplomatic maturity. 
So has been the evolution of Sino-Bhutan relations, since the 
launching in 1984 of boundary talks between Thimphu and 
Beijing (Mathou, 2004). Although Bhutan would not explore the 
possibility of using the PRC to balance the influence of India, the 
reign of the Fourth King had demonstrated that Bhutan had 
obvious interests in normalising its relations with China without 
undermining its partnership with New Delhi. Twenty-one rounds 
of talks have proved so far that Bhutan and China are capable of 
dealing with a mature relation. The two countries have been using 
the annual consultations to exchange views on ways to expand 
bilateral relations. Although still limited these relations have been 
evolving towards a progressive normalization. Bhutan’s handling 
of the Tibetan question has not hampered this process. On the 
contrary, Bhutan’s policy towards Tibetan refugees turned to be a 
domestic issue in the Kingdom back in the mid-1970s. Although, 
this policy had not been designed to fit Chinese interest, Bhutan’s 
                                                                          Thierry Mathou 
 31 
attitude during the last thirty years has given to the kingdom, the 
only Mahayana Buddhist state in the world, a unique position in 
the region. While Bhutan had strong cultural, religious and 
historical links with ancient Tibet and sympathy for modern 
Tibet, it has never advocated a pro-active policy on the 
international scene in favour of the Tibetan question. When the 
Kingdom is ready, this approach will participate in the emergence 
of Bhutan’s “Chinese real-politic” whose basic principles have 
been settled for the future by King Jigme Singye Wangchuck. 
Diplomatic maturity has also been visible through the progressive 
diversification of Bhutan’s relations both on the regional and 
international scenes. Becoming a member of the United Nations 
had four consequences for Bhutan. First it gave the Kingdom a 
new window on the world. Although the King chose not to attend 
personally the annual General Assembly, Bhutan has used the UN 
as an alternative channel of communication with the outside 
world and as a platform to assert its international status and to 
consolidate financial assistance for its economic development. 
Second, it boosted its diplomacy. Bhutan currently has diplomatic 
relations with 22 countries, including the European Union. All 
these relations – except the one with India – have been formally 
established under the leadership of the Fourth King. They are all 
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important as Bhutan only decides to enlarge its diplomatic 
spectrum on the basis of very pragmatic objectives. Yet regional 
diplomacy has been the most significant not only because the 
King committed himself, but also because regional issues are 
crucial for Bhutan.  
As a founding member of SAARC in 1985, Bhutan has supported 
the concept of regional cooperation in South Asia. Its 
membership not only helped the kingdom to contribute to more 
balanced relations in the region but also, being a landlocked 
country, to reap benefits from economic co-operation with other 
SAARC countries like Bangladesh. The Fourth King has been 
constantly insisting on “self-reliance and independence through 
inter-dependence” (SAARC, 1985). His speeches during SAARC 
summits were unique occasions to have direct insights of his 
diplomatic endeavours or initiatives. Under his guidance, Bhutan 
not only participated in several SAARC meetings but has also 
been occasionally actively involved in promoting regional co-
operation in the region. This was the case when Bhutan offered 
itself as a mediator between the Government of Sri Lanka and 
Tamil insurgents in 1985. Bhutan has not emerged as an “Eastern 
Geneva” because such an objective does not fit with its 
diplomatic ambition. But it proved to be very consistent in its 
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approach toward regional politics. The Fourth King who was 
initially worried about the exclusion of political issues from the 
framework of the SAARC agreement has regularly insisted on the 
“historic significance for South Asia to manifest its united 
commitment to regional peace, co-operation and advancement” 
(Kharat, 1999, p.56). Although Bhutan joined the United Nations 
in 1971, and Non Aligned Movement in 1973 and other 
organisations like the Colombo Plan, the SAARC membership 
proved to be a major milestone in its foreign policy. SAARC has 
to date shown limited success due to its nature and scope and to 
the relations existing between the members countries, but it 
proved to be very beneficial to Bhutan, who has used it as a very 
practical window to the world. The kingdom has also gained 
several advantages in participating in its developmental activities 
in agriculture, rural development, forestry, tourism, 
communications, ressource planning, trade and industry. 
Although Bhutan has been keen not to treat the Lhotshampa 
question as a regional issue but as a bilateral issue with Nepal, 
this question had dominated Bhutanese diplomacy on the regional 
level. The matter has been taken very seriously by the Fourth 
King. Several bilateral talks have been held between Nepal and 
Bhutan to address the issue of refugee camps. Unfortunately 
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political upheavals in Kathmandu and recurrent 
misunderstandings between the two governments prevented them 
to seek a viable solution to the problem. Yet this issue, that could 
have been detrimental to Bhutan’s image abroad, was managed in 
a very pragmatic and balanced manner. “A well planned and 
positive campaign of a possible threat to Bhutan’s small size, and 
one which is rare in its ethnic identity, had created favourable 
world opinion towards Bhutan” (Kharat, 2005, p.176). 
So far Bhutan’s exposure to the world has been very positive for 
the kingdom both in terms of strategic, political and economic 
considerations without undermining its relationship with India. 
This has been clearly demonstrated when the 1949 Treaty was 
superseded by the 2007 Treaty with India which made de jure 
what was de facto, that Bhutan was the master of her own foreign 
relations according to what King Jigme Singye Wangchuck had 
always promoted.  
Challenges Ahead 
Bhutan stands on the threshold of new challenges more daunting 
than those it had confronted in the past. The maintenance of its 
identity, sovereignty and security as a nation-state will remain 
crucial. “The existence of Bhutan is not a historical accident. It is 
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the result of conscious actions taken over several centuries” 
(Planning Commission, 1999). No doubt that these actions have 
been decisive under the reign of the Fourth King. Bhutan is the 
sole surviving custodian of a social and cultural system that once 
extended beyond the Eastern Himalayas to embrace a large part 
of Eastern and Southern Asia. The stability that has been 
maintained during the last thirty years stands in sharp contrast to 
the situation prevailing in some other parts of the sub-region. At 
the same time Bhutan has experienced considerable changes. 
Contrary to most developing countries where colonialism and its 
legacy resulted in the destruction of traditional institutions and 
their replacement by alien structures of government that were 
often unable to take root in a new environment, Bhutan has not 
been struggling to make sense of imported institutions because it 
has been able to reform its own institutions. 
The Fourth King has given a great legacy to his successor and to 
the RGOB. The monarchy will continue to keep a central role. 
Although the Fifth King will not be at the forefront as was his 
predecessor, he is vested with significant powers under the 
constitution and will remain the last resort should the country 
face a crisis. However, in a context where the monarch will not 
be and must not be the sole agent of modernization, the polity 
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will have to find a new balance. The role of the state will have to 
be redefined from that of a “provider” to that of an “enabler” of 
democracy. Responsibilities should be increasingly shared with 
the parliament and local committees and new partnerships will 
have to be formed with political parties. Responsibility of the 
cabinet, bureaucracy and members of parliaments will have to 
increase. 
It is too early to assess how effective the measures taken under 
the provision of the constitution will be, since they are so recent. 
The state has traditionally ruled with a close degree of control 
over citizens’ activities, and it is not clear how far the new 
freedoms may be exercised. The parliamentary-like evolution is 
due to have significant impact on Bhutanese politics where 
personal destinies have been exclusively promoted by the Palace. 
The impact of factional alignments and political parties on the 
emergence of a stable support base within the National Assembly 
for long term programmes and policies has to be seen. Under the 
its “haphazard electoral system, there was limited continuity of 
membership and only a small proportion of the people’s 
representatives in the Assembly had a lengthy experience in 
government” (Rose, 1977). Under the new system representatives 
of the people will have to prove in the long term their ability to 
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challenge the bureaucracy’s elite position so that the National 
Assembly become a real channel for advancement of the people 
that will dominate the decision-making process. Further progress 
will also have to be made to involve local communities in the 
decision making-process to widen the gap between rural and 
urban populations, and between educated and uneducated people, 
which are still the major lines dividing the society and polity. As 
earlier demonstrated, the political consciousness of members of 
the National Assembly and of local committees has been 
progressively increasing. Yet they have been essentially 
interested in local issues. This is why conservatism is still 
dominant among their circles. 
In that context, the major challenge for the regime will be to 
allow a confrontation to happen in other occasions than the 
sessions of the National Assembly or the meetings of the local 
committees in a form that does not contradict consensus politics. 
It will be critical for new institutions to safeguard the basics of 
consensus and to promote at the same time further 
democratisation along distinctively Bhutanese lines.  
The rising of the civil society that encompasses the space outside 
the sphere of government will have to contribute to that process. 
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It usually includes a wide range of groups such as welfare 
associations, religious associations, youth and women groups, 
alumni associations, environmental groups, community 
organizations, industry groups, and academic and professional 
associations. Organised civil society is a very new phenomenon 
in Bhutan. The Civil Society Act was only passed in July 2007, 
and only a handful of organisations have registered as yet. There 
is not yet any group dedicated to governance issues or election 
observation. As the prevailing culture of consensus does not 
foment voices of critical opposition, it remains to be seen how 
effective and independent an individual domestic observer might 
be. Civil society is expected to play a greater role in contributing 
to the objectives of Good Governance. Providing platforms and 
forums at national levels and within dzongkhags for civil society 
organizations to participate as partners to complement local 
committees and parliament actions will be needed (Royal 
Government of Bhutan, 2005). Although the private sector is still 
in its infancy, entrepreneurs are forming a new category in the 
society whose role will be decisive in the coming years. The 
question of power sharing between government, private sector 
and NGOs will become more and more accurate.  
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As a new factor of Bhutanese politics, the role of political parties 
will be critical in the coming years. The Fourth King has been 
cautious to avoid the main risk that would have resulted from 
letting divisive forces of communalism interfere with the 
democratization process. This is the reason why the legalisation 
of ethnic-based political movements alone has not been allowed 
as it would probably have been fatal to the culture of consensus. 
The constitution provides that party membership cannot be based 
on region, sex, language, religion or social origin. Indeed this is a 
restrictive provision. The local polity will have to find other fault 
lines adapted to its nature, at least for the moment. The opposition 
between progressives and conservatives, which already exists, 
though it has not generated definitive political tensions, could 
draw these lines. On the long term however what seems 
impossible under the current polity could become necessary 
should the people acquire the level of political maturity that 
allows the system to evolve without losing its identity. It will be 
interesting to see how the two political parties, namely the Druk 
Phuensum Tshogpa (Party of Blissful Harmony, DPT) and the 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which have been allowed to 
participate in the democratisation process and that both refer to 
GNH as the source of their inspiration in rather similar terms, will 
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be able to differentiate one from the other to organise a real 
democratic debate. This issue will be very acute in the context 
where the opposition party is very weak. Most observers have 
been surprised by the results of recent parliamentary elections 
where the DPT routed the PDP and won 45 of the 47 seats of the 
first new National Assembly. Yet this landslide victory shows 
how consensus politics is deeply rooted in the minds of the 
Bhutanese people at large. It will take time for the very concept 
of opposition to mature within the current polity. The absence of 
real opposition will be a challenge for the incoming government 
that will have to prevent consensus from being seen as a denial of 
democracy. The two parties are in the early stages of their 
development, and as yet few policy differences between them 
have emerged. Both have committed to follow the Tenth Five 
Year Plan already agreed upon by the previous government.7 So 
far personalities have been more significant than ideological 
differences in the emerging political debate as shown by the 
results of parliamentary elections. Some fear that the introduction 
of democracy might create conflicts and divisions in a society 
where consensus plays an important role. So far the results of the 
elections contradict such a predicament. On the medium term it is 
desirable for the sake of democracy that debates evolve along 
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lines other than personality questions. Both parties have been 
active in preparing the National Assembly campaign, seeking to 
recruit members and familiarising the population with their 
candidates. There have been mutual accusations of misconduct 
that have been widely reported in the press and some complaints 
have been made to the Election Commission of Bhutan (ECB) 
before and after the vote. The elections have already introduced a 
new era of fractional debate which has mostly entailed duelling 
allegations of vote buying. This is the first sign of new 
behaviours that will contribute to a progressive politicisation of 
the society. Further developments have yet to be seen. Though 
the opposition is weak, the National Council will help ensure that 
the DPT is accountable to the public. At the same time the PDP 
will probably have to work hard for the next term and several 
topics could create fault lines within or outside the current polity.  
For instance the implementation of GNH will be challenged. 
There are obvious contradictions between market economy and 
Gross National Happiness. First, 
the current role of the state contradicts a flourishing private 
sector. Rather than a paternalistic state, which directly interferes 
in all parts of development, private sector developments calls for 
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retreat of the state to the position of a monitoring agent backed by 
a transparent legal framework. Second, to promote private 
business effectively, the government is compelled to restructure 
its development priorities towards an increased centrality of 
economic concerns. Third, private sector development requires a 
reorientation of people’s attitude towards savings, consumption, 
work, time, and profit from traditional values to the rules of the 
market (Priesner, 1999, pp.43-44).  
Priesner’s categorization could be applied to some extent to non-
economic sectors and to the society as a whole. In that context, 
notwithstanding the state’s capacity to correct market or social 
failures, structural pressures could possibly “jeopardise the non-
economic objective of Bhutanese development such as cultural 
and environment preservation” (ibid).  
As it democratises, its polity Bhutan will be more and more 
exposed to influences from the outside world. Even if the 
temptation is great to protect the people and the culture from 
these influences “globalisation” is gaining ground. For a small 
country like Bhutan “it is a great challenge to manoeuvre between 
the Scylla of a hasty course towards development, risking to 
destroy its individuality, and the Charbydis of stagnation and 
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retrenchment, risking the shrinkage of Bhutan’s culture into a 
folkloristic phenomenon” (Schaik, 1999). Although strategic 
parameters of Bhutan’s foreign policy are not expected to change 
dramatically in the medium-terms as long as the China-India 
relation remains on the current trend, regional politics will 
probably have more impact on Bhutan. In that context, current 
political and constitutional evolution in neighbouring Nepal will 
have to be monitored very carefully in Bhutan. Although the 
difficult issue of people in refugee camps in Eastern Nepal is 
about to find the path of a solution, as some of these people may 
to be resettled in the United States under a third-country 
resettlement programme, it does not mean however that political 
activism which has been growing on the ground of ethnic dissent 
in Bhutan’s southern districts will fade away. On the contrary, the 
RGOB will have to count on the development of a political 
opposition well organised in Nepal and whose migration to the 
United States and to other countries will give it the chance to 
structure its ideology and to challenge the regime. The 
resounding defeat of the PDP has created a vacuum that exiled 
parties will probably consider filling out. Their capacity to find 
support within Bhutan will largely depend on the ability of the 
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new Bhutanese polity to demonstrate its dedication to promote 
further reforms.  
So far this ability has been remarkable. The Fourth King has 
demonstrated that reform in a traditional society does not 
necessarily imply the destruction of this society. Far from 
conservatism, change in continuity has been a reality in Bhutan 
and a credible alternative to revolution. This is the core of King 
Jigme Singye Wangchuck’s political vision and constitutional 
legacy and the vital lead of his action as a ruling monarch. As 
Bhutan enters uncharted political waters, his vision will remain 
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Notes 
                                                   
1 According to the distinctly Bhutanese customs of the times, the great, 
great-grand father of the Fourth King was elected the first hereditary King 
by consensus of a genja (an oath of allegiance) which was then stamped 
with the seals of all sections of Bhutanese society in 1907. 
2 The Election Bill of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 2008 states that a person is 
qualified to be elected as a Member of the National Assembly and of the 
National Council if he “possesses a formal university degree”, can be 
interpreted to some extent as a continuation of this principle. To be elected 
as a Member of a local government, a candidate must be functionally 
literate and possesses skills adequate to discharge his duties. So far these 
restrictive provisions that exclude a majority of the population have not 
been widely criticised.  
3 The media has recently become liberalised, with the passing of the Media 
Act in 2006. Two private weekly newspapers (the Bhutan Times and the 
Bhutan Observer) have begun operating, and two commercial radio 
stations, together with some cable TV channels, are now broadcasting. 
4 Internet facilities are reliable in Thimphu but very primitive elsewhere 
except for Phuentsholing. 
5 Two mock elections were conducted in April and May 2007. 
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6 When he retired in 1998, Lyonpo Dawa Tsering was the longest serving 
Minister of Foreign affairs in the world.  
7 A third party, the Bhutan People United Party was rejected by the ECB in 
part because it did not meet the cross-national requirement. Political parties 
formed by refugees are not permitted to operate inside Bhutan and are 
considered to be anti-national by the Bhutanese government. 
